Russian Agent in Norway: False Nord Stream 2 Security Certificates or Industrial Espionage?

Russian Agent in Norway: False Nord Stream 2 Security Certificates or Industrial Espionage?

Russia may have corrupted European government officials who issued permits for the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline construction. The arrest of a Russian intelligence agent in Oslo, Norway, might speak for that.

A Norwegian citizen has been arrested as a suspect of disclosing classified information.  The man was arrested after allegedly meeting with a Russian intelligence officer in an Oslo restaurant.

The NRK says the arrested man and the Russian agent were present during the arrest. But taking into account that only one person was detained, the Russian intelligence officer, arguably, had diplomatic immunity, and the detention followed a long-term cultivation. The detainee is a man in his 50s, suspected of sharing information with a Russian intelligence officer, some open sources claim.

He has received money for information, according to the ruling by the city court.

The arrested man is an employee of DNV GL, an Oslo-headquartered international company well known for being a world leader in risk management and quality assurance.

VP Director of Media Relations with DNV GL Group, Per Wiggo Richardson, confirmed to VG the man being an employee with the company, but Richardson would not elaborate.

VG’s information, though, claims the man to be working in a position putting him in contact with Norwegian defense industry and research in the sphere of advanced military technology.

DNV GL is linked with the Nord Stream 2 project: it is DNV GL that verifies DNV-OS-F101 underwater pipeline certificates of conformity to the offshore standard for the gas pipeline.

“Nord Stream AG engineers and DNV GL experts work closely together to develop a pipeline integrity management system and to verify and monitor its operation and maintenance.”

In November 2019, DNV GL has extended the certificate of conformity to the offshore standard for underwater pipelines DNV-OS-F101 for the Nord Stream gas pipeline for the seventh time.

The Nord Stream Pipeline was designed and built in compliance with DNV GL’s international certification standard DNV-OS-F101. During the commissioning of Line 2 in October 2012, DNV GL issued the first certificate confirming the compliance of the Nord Stream Pipeline with the requirements of said standard. Over the following years, Nord Stream AG engineers and DNV GL experts have been working closely together to develop the Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS), as well as to verify and monitor its operation and maintenance procedures.

Marcus Korthals, Compliance Director at Nord Stream AG, said: “Since 2012, DNV GL has been providing us with the highest quality expertise in construction and operation of offshore pipelines. We are pleased that this well-known international company recognizes the integrity of our system, which guarantees reliable and safe transportation of natural gas from Russia to Europe.”

Nils Andreas Masvie, Vice President Eurasia at DNV GL Oil & Gas, also said: “We are once again pleased to confirm the highest level of safety and reliability of the Nord Stream gas pipeline. Since the pipeline’s commissioning in 2012, Nord Stream AG has shown that both lines of the pipeline meet the most stringent requirements of the offshore standard regulations for subsea pipelines every year.”

Considering a DNV GL employee arrest on charges of having ties to Russian intelligence, some lines of enquiry as for Russia’s interest could be put forward. Moscow, first of all, might be interested in facilitating documentary support for the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline with security certificates and information on LNG projects. The process and validity of obtaining gas pipeline security certificates, both in Norway and in other countries, therefore, requires additional verification and confirmation.

However, the most likely, that Russian intel was interested in 3D technology for oil&gas industry. The technology could allow organizations to access an archive of digital designs for immediate on-site printing rather than maintaining physical inventories of spare parts and/or waiting for them to be made and transported to a platform or vessel. For example, a financial case can be proved for using 3D printing for offshore risers, gas-turbine nozzles, subsea chemical stick injection tools and nozzles for downhole cleanout tools. There is also potential to scale up additive manufacturing for larger structures.

“This is a potential revolution for the oil & gas and offshore & marine sectors in the way products are designed, manufactured, and distributed to end users.

Previously PST warns on Russian espionage being the main threat, saying Russian agents target Norwegian individuals in attempts to access secret information.

This is the first time a Norwegian citizen is accused of selling state secrets to Russia since Arne Treholt was arrested in 1984 and sentenced to 20 years in prison the following year. Treholt was at the time an official with the Foreign Ministry in Oslo. 

This fact indicates that Russian intelligence has increased its activity in Norway, close to the Cold War times.

Hanne Blomberg, chief of counter espionage at PST confirmed on May 6, 2020 that Russia’s intelligence uses the embassy as a cover for their intelligence officers. She claimed that several of the Russian intelligence-gathering agencies have a presence in Norway and use diplomatic cover through the embassy.

PST (Politiets sikkerhetstjeneste) has been warning for years that Russia, along with China, represents a major security threat to Norway. So do spies posing as diplomats as they travel around Norway, nurture contacts and gain access to politicians in Parliament, government ministries and companies.

Four Russian intelligence officers, up to this day, are known to operate in Norway, holding cover positions at the Russian embassy in Oslo.

Sergey Sventitsky, Counselor of the Russian Embassy in Norway until 2019. Andrey Kolesnikov was sent to replace him in Oslo.

Alexander Anikin, Trade Representative, born in 1961 (used to work for the Ministry of Economic Development, Korben International Industrial and Financial Corporation vice-president, was sent to Oslo in 2016).

Alexander Anikin. Russia’s MFA.

Mikhail Rodionychev, born in 1979, Deputy Trade Representative.

Andrey Nazarenko, Advisor to the Russian Ambassador to Norway, born in 1968. He used to work for the 18th Central Scientific Research Institute of Russia’s Defense Ministry.

The intelligence officer who met with the Norwegian citizen was Aleksandr Stekolshchikov , the deputy of Trade Representative in Russian Embassy. Previously he worked as the Second secretary in the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations.